How would Brexit affect Liverpool and the Premier league.

Discussion in 'Pitchside - Football Forum' started by eng.amohd, Apr 19, 2017.

  1. eng.amohd

    eng.amohd The false nine

    Messages:
    331
    Likes Received:
    251
    I have been playing football manager recently and the after going through a lot of Brexits, I have been wondering, how, given the current political leadership stance, would Brexit affect the Premier League generally and Liverpool specifically? Will we be able to sign European players easily? What about our current "foreign" players? Will this affect us in the Champions League? I know these questions' answers aren't quite clear now, but I am hoping some of the locals may be able to predict some answers.


    Please note that this is NOT a political thread. As an IGCSE graduate and LFC lover, I have a great affinity for British history, education and the Premier league. But since I am an Egyptian, Brexit realistically doesn't affect me in any way. So please don't take this thread into the political debate, which is supposed to be in the "Brexit: good idea or not?" thread.
     
    Maria, Scott Jones and inaiq like this.
  2. Da Bulli

    Da Bulli Well-Known Member

    Messages:
    431
    Likes Received:
    272
    My prediction is this. Brexit will complicate things.

    Caveat : I am not a local and I am the least knowledgeable person on Brexit on this forum.
     
    redfanman likes this.
  3. Kopstar

    Kopstar ★★★★★ Valued Member

    Messages:
    6,056
    Likes Received:
    9,268
    It's impossible to predict but Brexit is likely to make it easier for us to snap up young South American talent.

    The immediate impact, however, is likely to be negligible.
     
  4. RedSeven

    RedSeven On the one road Valued Member

    Messages:
    4,391
    Likes Received:
    1,219

    What makes it difficult to do so now and how would that change after britain leaves the EU?
     
    Flobs and eng.amohd like this.
  5. redfanman

    redfanman TIA Regular Valued Member

    Messages:
    7,911
    Likes Received:
    4,110
    Not sure. My assumption where @Kopstar is coming from is that because we are open to free movement in the EU, if the government wishes to reduce immigration, it can only be done by restricting non-EU citizens coming to the UK. Therefore, in theory, if following brexit, EU movement into the UK is also restricted, it opens up the possibility rules could change favourably for Non-EU citizens.

    The key question then, is would the government want to make that change?

    There was an interesting article by the owner of Crystal Palace on why he thinks Brexit would be good for developing British talent as it would simplify the squad system, (i.e discrepancies around young players from other european countries in the academy and how we treat welsh/scottish players) but i dont know if the issues he raises would be resolved by us leaving the EU.
     
    eng.amohd and Cologne-Liverpool like this.
  6. Jimmyscase

    Jimmyscase DoctorJimmy's casebook. Aerial knee-job merchant

    Messages:
    105
    Likes Received:
    101
    Brexit weakens anti-competition law which has been in place for the last ten years up til now in Article 106 of the Lisbon Treaty. This might have repercussions in TV and marketing decisions. From the moment Britain leaves, London clubs will exploit the fact that the capital, relative to the rest of the country, will present a cosmopolitan face to young talented EU players, unfortunately.
     
    eng.amohd likes this.
  7. Arminius

    Arminius FSG PR plant Moderator

    Messages:
    14,578
    Likes Received:
    10,729
    Considering that the primary obstacle to doing so is self-inflicted, and not a function of EU law, that seems unlikely. The UK has a unique regime for admitting non-EU players which is among the most restrictive, and post-Brexit will have less access to the South American players who have a claim to an EU dual citizenship.
     
    eng.amohd, redfanman and RedSeven like this.
  8. Kopstar

    Kopstar ★★★★★ Valued Member

    Messages:
    6,056
    Likes Received:
    9,268
    It's self-inflicted partly as a consequence of EU law. I think in future clubs are likely to have less restrictions on bringing in overseas players (from wherever they originate) and instead the FA and the Home Office will look solely towards minimum quotas for home grown players. I would also like to see the footballing authorities limit the amount of players that a club is allowed to loan out at any one time.
     
  9. Arminius

    Arminius FSG PR plant Moderator

    Messages:
    14,578
    Likes Received:
    10,729
    What is the connection between EU law and the UK's rules? Weren't they even more restrictive pre-EU? In theory, the 'pathway for English talent' idea would be easier to implement if EU players did not have unrestricted access, but in practice none of the changes so far have improved English clubs' access to South American talent. That is simply because the desire to restrict access to only established elite players flies in the face of the reality of South American club football, where most clubs really cannot retain a young player in the face of predatory European clubs by the time the player is earning a first cap. I haven't seen much drive toward changing that 'established elite players' idea, although I can't say I am tuned into the conversations.
     
    redfanman likes this.
  10. Kopstar

    Kopstar ★★★★★ Valued Member

    Messages:
    6,056
    Likes Received:
    9,268
    Competition laws have been in place since 1957 and the Treaty of Rome (Articles 85-86). Those are now Articles 101-102 of the renamed TFEU.

    Since the original Treaty of Rome, the completion of an internal market free from distorted competition has been one of the flagship policies of the European project. The UK has contributed to the dissemination of a "competition culture", not just in the UK but also more broadly within the EU, through its proactive and pragmatic advances in competition law. I don't think Brexit will necessarily weaken anti-competition law given the UK is already ahead of the game here in comparison with the EU. I am not a competition lawyer so the below is the opinion of Anneli Howard of Monckton Chambers.

    In practical terms, there will be no immediate "fall-out" from the UK's withdrawal from the EU. Article 50 provides for a two-year transitional period, which can be extended by consent. In any event, the Chapter I and II prohibitions in the Competition Act 1998 are modelled on Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, so there will be little substantive change in the short term.

    Many of the concepts underpinning the application of those provisions have been transplanted from the EU regime, so UK competition law will continue as before. Directive 2014/104 on actions for damages for breach of competition law has been implemented and its provisions will take effect through the domestic legislation in the form of amendments to primary and secondary legislation.

    The only question is whether section 60 of the 1998 Act will continue to apply. Section 60 provides that any questions relating to competition within the UK are to be dealt with in a manner which is consistent with the treatment of corresponding questions in EU law. Section 60(2) provides that an English court must ensure that there is no inconsistency between the principles that it applies under the 1998 Act and the principles laid down in the TFEU and any case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The court must also have regard to any decisions or statements of the European Commission (the Commission).

    Following Brexit, an English court may determine that it is no longer under any obligation, either under Article 4(3) of the TEU or under its duty of sincere co-operation, to ensure consistency between national competition law and EU competition law. This means that, over time, there may be a gradual divergence between CJEU case law and Commission practice, on the one hand, and Competition and Market Authority (CMA) decisions and English case law on the other.

    While it is likely that an English court will still have regard to developments that are ongoing in the EU, the status of any CJEU rulings or Commission decisions will be relegated to persuasive rather than binding authority. It may also mean that there may be a "gradual drift" if our national courts start to pay more regard to developments in the US or in other countries such as Australia, Singapore or China as a source of inspiration for the development of competition law in future.

    In practical terms, the risks of divergence may not be so great. However, there are well-known precedents in EU competition law which are founded more on the policy of achieving the internal market rather than pure competition law considerations. For instance, the jurisprudence relating to vertical restraints over parallel imports or e-commerce has more to do with creating a single market than economic efficiencies. Similarly, the case law on a dominant company's ability to impose fidelity rebates is not so much underpinned by economic rationale but by the Commission's theory of harm which is very different to US policy. It may be that, over time, English courts start to align UK law with policy considerations in the US.

    The impact of Brexit on public enforcement will very much depend on the model that is used for the UK's future engagement with the EU. If the UK becomes a member of the European Free Trade Associaiton (EFTA) (like Norway and Iceland), then public enforcement would be conducted by the Surveillance Authority rather than the Commission with an appeal to the EFTA court. In essence, the prohibitions and practice and procedure would remain the same.

    If Brexit means complete exit, then the UK would no longer form part of the European Competition Network (ECN) and Regulation 1/2003 would no longer be of direct application in the UK. This in turn would mean that the Competition Markets Authority (CMA) and other sectoral regulators in the UK would no longer be able to liaise and co-ordinate with their counterparts in the 27 other member states. In practical terms, they would negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding in a similar way to the ones negotiated between the Commission and the US Department of Justice or other anti-trust authorities around the world. That would provide for exchange of information and mutual assistance between regulators but would not necessarily provide the same degree of protections for undertakings caught up in any allegations of alleged anti-competitive behaviour.

    It is quite clear that as a result of the extra territoriality of EU competition law, any businesses in the UK would still be liable for any infringements of EU competition law that affect the EU market, so UK companies would be in no different position to US or Asian companies that have been the subject of cartel investigations under Article 101 of the TFEU or, like Microsoft and Google, abuse allegations under Article 102 of the TFEU.

    However, in terms of practical enforcement, there would be no clear guidelines for the assumption of jurisdiction. This means that, while the undertakings may be subject to investigation by the Commission, they would still remain a target for a separate investigation by the UK authorities. That duplication of cost and resource would be a heavy burden for any company.

    Similarly, there would be no real certainty for leniency applicants as the Commission's Notice on Co-operation between national competition authorities (NCAs) would no longer apply. In practical terms, a leniency applicant would have to make duplicate applications to the UK authorities as well as to the Commission and/or other authorities in the EU and around the world. Although the practical cost of duplicating a leniency application is not extensive by itself, the subsequent engagement and dialogue with multiple regulators would be a drain on resources.

    The real risk is not so much in making the application but in what happens subsequently to the information provided. The Commission's Co-operation Notice and the provisions of Regulation 1/2003 and the new Damages Directive (2014/104/EU) provide extensive protections for leniency materials to prevent their disclosure to other NCAs which do not have a sufficient degree of protection and/or their subsequent disclosure and admissibility as evidence in court.

    In their absence, it is hoped that the UK would manage to negotiate procedural safeguards that are equivalent, but there is no guarantee of that. That would increase the risk of a leniency applicant's materials being disclosed to other regulators, whether in the EU or elsewhere, which might expose the company to further investigations and infringement findings, with the risk of double fines. Any findings of infringement would provide material for fresh follow-on damages actions, which in the US attract treble damages.

    There is also the risk that disclosure of leniency material could expose individuals to criminal prosecution in the UK, Ireland or the US. Legal uncertainties regarding these issues could be expected to have a dampening effect on leniency applications from companies in the UK, which might then reduce the number of cartels that are detected and enforced by the competition authorities.

    Regulation 1/2003 also provides for extensive co-operation between the NCAs and the Commission in terms of co-ordinating warrant applications, dawn raids and investigations. Technically, post-Brexit, the CMA and sectorial regulators in the UK would no longer be bound by any obligation of sincere co-operation, whether as a general principle or under Regulation 1/2003. This means that they would not have to defer to the exercise of authority by the Commission or by another NCA and be required to stay or renounce their domestic investigations.

    Similarly, an English court, faced with domestic proceedings, would not necessarily have to stay its proceedings to avoid making a ruling that might run counter to a decision issued or in contemplation by the Commission, nor would a national court have to stay proceedings pending any appeal by the defendants to the European courts.

    The absence of such co-ordination measures could result in a proliferation of investigations and concurrent court proceedings in relation to the same conduct in both the UK and across the EU, resulting in further expense and uncertainty for the companies involved.

    The risk of double jeopardy is not fanciful. Although the companies may be able to raise ne bis in idem arguments against being prosecuted twice for the same conduct, the European courts have taken a very narrow view of what constitutes the same interest, and there is no guarantee that the accused companies would be able to successfully prevent multiple investigations and duplicate findings. For example, in the Visa Interchange proceedings, Visa Europe was investigated by the Commission in 2007 at the same time as being investigated by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK. In that case, the OFT refused to relinquish its investigation on the basis that its investigation related to the UK domestic rate, rather than the cross-border rate.

    The situation becomes all the more complicated when you take account of the wider scope of UK competition law such as the market investigation regime under the Enterprise Act 2002 and sectoral regulatory powers. For instance, a sectoral regulator may start to investigate the same conduct under its regulatory powers which is the subject of a concurrent anti-trust investigation by the Commission. For example, in Telecom Polska, the Polish incumbent telecoms operator was investigated and fined by the domestic regulator, the Office of Electronic Commissions, at the same time as the Commission was investigating the same alleged conduct under Article 102 of the TFEU. Telecom Polska was indicted to pay two separate fines, one at national level and one at European level.

    The UK has its own well-established private damages regime, which is far more extensive than that at EU level, as it also covers opt-in and opt-out collective actions under the new Consumer Rights Act 2015. In many ways, the UK regime is more advanced than the EU regime (especially in terms of disclosure and specialist tribunals). Most of the initiatives introduced in the Damages Directive were modelled on the UK regime anyway, those provisions will be implemented into the UK regime and, what is more, are likely to be "gold plated" so that they are equally applicable to EU infringements as well as to UK infringements.

    So Brexit alone is unlikely to dampen the recent enthusiasm for competition damages litigation.

    However, there may be a "softer" impact of Brexit on the general appetite and confidence for bringing competition law damages in the UK. The recent upsurge in damages actions has largely been the result of an injection of funding for follow-on claims, where funders have been willing to commit because of the legal certainty provided as a result of the binding nature of Commission decisions. After Brexit, such decisions are likely to carry less weight in the UK regime. Their precise influence will depend on the Brexit model: if there is a complete exit where the UK relies on a bilateral free trade agreement or the WTO (World Trade Organisation), then Commission decisions may have some persuasive authority, but the exact scope and weight will be up to the national judge.

    The judge will be free to depart from the Commission's findings and economic analysis and may substitute his own assessment of the evidence before him and his own interpretation of the law. If section 60 of the 1998 Act were repealed or national judges chose to depart from Commission decisions, then it can be expected that follow-on litigation in the UK will shrink.

    Follow-on litigation will become much more "parochial" as the scope of damages actions will be limited to regional or national findings of infringement by the CMA or the sectoral regulators or possibly those within EFTA. Whilst it remains open for claimants to bring standalone actions, and there may be some room for claimants to rely on a Commission decision against non-addressees in the UK and ask the national courts to extrapolate the Commission's findings to facts beyond the scope of the decision, there is no guarantee that the national courts would do that.

    The increased complexities and uncertainties may not give claimants and funders the comfort that they would require to commit to litigation in the UK opposed to Germany or the Netherlands. A shift in the costs-to-risk ratio could undermine funding incentives, with particular impact on the nascent development of opt-in and opt-out collective actions. It would be a real shame if the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) with its new powers and highly geared expertise were deprived of the oxygen and momentum provided by litigation funding for the fledgling development of collective actions.

    The Brussels I Regulation will no longer have direct applicability in the UK post Brexit, which means that there would be a lacuna in the co-ordination of parallel litigation proceedings across the EU. The Regulation has not been implemented directly into national UK law so the rules governing jurisdiction and lis alibi pendens will no longer apply.

    The UK used to have a well-developed system of private international law in the common law, or it could conceivably adopt the previous rules in the Brussels or Lugano Conventions. However, even relatively small divergences create opportunities for forum shopping, as procedural differences (such as limitation or the extent of disclosure) can make a substantial difference to the outcome of a trial.

    The UK is currently enjoying a pre-eminent position as "one-stop shop" for private competition law damages, attracting claimants from all over Europe suing defendants from all over the world simply by finding an "anchor defendant" in the UK. If there are no clear jurisdiction rules, which co-ordinate with the other EU member states, then there will be an increasing amount of jurisdiction challenges and concurrent related proceedings, increasing litigation cost and uncertainty. Further, the hallmark judgment from the UK courts may not be as easily recognised and enforced in the other 27 member states, which would compromise the attractiveness of litigating in the UK.

    Lastly, the UK courts will no longer qualify as a "court" for the purposes of the Article 267 of the TFEU preliminary reference procedure. This means that UK litigants will no longer be able to challenge the validity of Commission decisions by bringing domestic proceedings or refer questions regarding the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Damages Directive to the CJEU. The UK government will no longer have the automatic right to intervene in preliminary references from courts in the other member states. That means that the UK's influence in shaping the practice and procedure in Europe will be lost.

    The whole aim of the Damages Directive is to encourage competition damage claims, by alleviating the legal and evidential burdens on claimants via increased access to information and the introduction of presumptions of harm and pragmatic estimates for quantum and pass-on. The resulting divergences between the UK and the rest of the EU in the long term might start to unpick some of the vital toolkit that claimants need to start and pursue their claims. If the UK becomes an "outlier" where claimants cannot take the same advantage of those initiatives, the attractiveness of the UK as an international forum for competition law damages may be somewhat reduced.
     
  11. Kopstar

    Kopstar ★★★★★ Valued Member

    Messages:
    6,056
    Likes Received:
    9,268
    I'm afraid I don't know what the entry requirements were pre EU. I can only attest to what I feel is the majority view amongst clubs that I have spoken to in that the current system does not actually help achieve the objectives the FA want. The restrictions/entry requirements for player transfers for those outside of the EEA are unnecessarily arbitrary and do not allow the clubs to scout talent in the way that other countries are able to do. I imagine that greater freedom will be introduced into that process following Brexit.
     
    Arminius and redfanman like this.
  12. Chung

    Chung TIA Moderator Moderator

    Messages:
    2,684
    Likes Received:
    212
    Here's an idea. Increase the scout network within the UK, invest in better facilites at a local level, invest in getting the best coaches through the age groups to work with the clubs through the football system, overhaul the FA structure and maybe in about 10-15 years we'll see the benefit of this investment.
     
    eng.amohd and RedSeven like this.
  13. AussieLFC79

    AussieLFC79 TIA Regular

    Messages:
    2,605
    Likes Received:
    379
    Come on Chung, you know perfectly well that waiting that sort of time is totally unacceptable. We want it all done yesterday, and not a moment later. ;-)
     
    redfanman and inaiq like this.
  14. Arminius

    Arminius FSG PR plant Moderator

    Messages:
    14,578
    Likes Received:
    10,729
    General thinking is that it really takes 25. If you have a viable development program that has taken a wrong turn, you can get out of a dead end in 10-15 years. That would be Germany, post-1998. England's problems are more profound, and you essentially need two generations to fundamentally change talent development and then get it back to elite class. The first generation becomes the coaches needed, a generation that goes through the model and then is able to implement it the way it has to be. Iceland is a pretty fascinating example, the overnight success that took twenty years. The BBC and Guardian coverage I saw was notable for how much attention was paid to facilities, which are important, but something that took the Icelandic FA over 10 years to get in place - and which they value mainly because it minimizes days lost due to weather. I attended a seminar with a visiting KSI coach, and when asked about the one element that was key, his answer was getting the average coach to the UEFA B level - so that every child was coached to the highest standard from the very start. The A and Pro levels were just nice to have for the next steps.

    The problem becomes that the English FA is structurally incapable of that kind of patience. Recall Frye's 'long term' goal of winning the World Cup in 2022 - a space of 9 years, which in sporting development terms is less than a generation. If you think you are going to win the World Cup in 2022, you should more or less be able to list a core of truly elite 16 year olds. It isn't just the FA's fault, English football is now financially dependent on imported talent. How long could the Premier League remain atop global viewership with even half the imported talent? Probably not long.
     
  15. Kopstar

    Kopstar ★★★★★ Valued Member

    Messages:
    6,056
    Likes Received:
    9,268
    I agree with that but perhaps coincidentally England does have an elite group of U17s coming through but is the necessary structure in place to realise their potential in the next (most crucial) phase of their development? Doubtful.
     
    redfanman likes this.
  16. Arminius

    Arminius FSG PR plant Moderator

    Messages:
    14,578
    Likes Received:
    10,729
    I think that group is promising, but elite in a global sense? Not so sure about that. The old English habit of building castles in the sky is already happening - expectations for that team are already galloping ahead of anything that Spain had for their 2000 squad.

    BTW, is Stephen Sessegnon related to Ryan?
     
    redfanman likes this.
  17. RedSeven

    RedSeven On the one road Valued Member

    Messages:
    4,391
    Likes Received:
    1,219
    Ryan Sessegnon has a brother called Steven,I've read that Stephane Sessegnon is a cousin of theirs.
     
    redfanman likes this.
  18. Arminius

    Arminius FSG PR plant Moderator

    Messages:
    14,578
    Likes Received:
    10,729
    It was the English Stephen/Steven I was wondering about.
     
  19. eng.amohd

    eng.amohd The false nine

    Messages:
    331
    Likes Received:
    251
    Isn't that idea supposed to be taking place already? You shouldn't wait until something like Brexit to invest in the local level.
     
    inaiq and redfanman like this.
  20. inaiq

    inaiq "Some people feel the rain others just get wet"

    Messages:
    5,031
    Likes Received:
    3,364
    There are a lot of posts in the england thread. That reflect thoughts and options on the continued failure of thee FA and flaws in the English national teams setup/structure.
    There is also, IMO, a conflict the of agenda between The FA and the EPL.
    How brexit impacts on LFC/Football in general will, IMO, be driven by the EPL. Money talks, values and principles take second place.
     
    Chung, Jase and eng.amohd like this.
  21. Jase

    Jase Well-Known Member

    Messages:
    1,242
    Likes Received:
    1,448
    Agree. Bottom line will always be money. The FA will do its absolute best to insure a "soft Brexit" for professional footballers. The alternative could mean the EPL becoming a 2 or 3 horse race again and losing stature (and money) over time.
     
    inaiq likes this.
  22. eng.amohd

    eng.amohd The false nine

    Messages:
    331
    Likes Received:
    251
    I agree. If the English clubs aren't able to buy top talents easily, imo, the Premier League will lose much of its money, reputation and the whole country will lose a big source of income.
     
    inaiq likes this.
  23. inaiq

    inaiq "Some people feel the rain others just get wet"

    Messages:
    5,031
    Likes Received:
    3,364
    FA and EPL will, IMO, be on the same Page for a "soft brexit", whatever that might be, as with all other industries they will lobby. For what is best for them the. Maintain profits and profile.

    If it does go back to being a 2/3/4 horse race with a hard brexit, it will not benefit the national team. We have been there pre-EU and the national team were never amongst the world's elite..
     
    Jase and eng.amohd like this.
  24. inaiq

    inaiq "Some people feel the rain others just get wet"

    Messages:
    5,031
    Likes Received:
    3,364
    If this worst case scenario does happen, which I doubt, then yes the impact on football and it's supporting industries/partners will be significant. However, I believe these industries / partners will also lobby the government.
    If these industries / partners diversify into other football markets to maintain and grow their profits beyond what the EPL will offer post brexit then the will move their investments.
    IMO, all parties, EPL FA etc will not want to damage the football industry as There are too many votes and stakeholders who will be effected..
     
    eng.amohd likes this.

Share This Page